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Abstract  
A primary feature of the Next Generation Air 
Transportation System (NextGen) is trajectory based 
operations (TBO). Under TBO, aircraft flight plans 
are known to computer systems on the ground that 
aid in scheduling and separation. The Future Air 
Navigation System (FANS) was developed to support 
TBO, but relatively few aircraft in the US are FANS-
equipped. Thus, any near-term implementation must 
provide TBO procedures for non-FANS aircraft. 
Previous research has explored controller clearances, 
but any implementation must also provide procedures 
for aircraft requests. The work presented here aims to 
surface issues surrounding TBO communication 
procedures for non-FANS aircraft and for aircraft 
requesting deviations around weather. Three types of 
communication were explored: Voice, FANS, and 
ACARS,(Aircraft Communications Addressing and 
Reporting System). ACARS and FANS are datacom 
systems that differ in that FANS allows uplinked 
flight plans to be loaded into the Flight Management 
System (FMS), while ACARS delivers flight plans as 
text that must be entered manually via the Control 
Display Unit (CDU). Sixteen pilots (eight two-person 
flight decks) and four controllers participated in 32 
20-minute scenarios that required the flight decks to 
navigate through convective weather as they 
approached their top of descents (TODs). Findings: 
The rate of non-conformance was higher than 
anticipated, with aircraft off path more than 20% of 
the time.  Controllers did not differentiate between 
the ACARS and FANS datacom, and were mixed in 
their preference for Voice vs. datacom (ACARS and 
FANS). Pilots uniformly preferred Voice to datacom, 
particularly ACARS. Much of their dislike appears to 
result from the slow response times in the datacom 
conditions. As a result, participants frequently 
resorted to voice communication. These results imply 
that, before implementing TBO in environments 
where pilots make weather deviation requests, further 
research is needed to develop communication 
procedures that integrate voice and datacom. 
Introduction 
The US federal government has developed a 
plan for the Next Generation Air Transportation 
System (NextGen) that seeks to expand the capacity 
of the national airspace system (NAS) [1] by 
transforming air traffic control from clearance-based 
to trajectory-based operations (TBO). Under TBO, all 
aircraft fly negotiated 3D/4D trajectories from gate to 
gate. The advantage of TBO is that it makes it 
possible to more accurately predict future aircraft 
position, and in turn allows ground-based trajectory 
automation to monitor and ensure safe and efficient 
separation and scheduling. However, these benefits 
accrue only so long as aircraft stay on trajectories.  
Controller-pilot communication is at the heart of 
keeping aircraft on trajectories. In current operations 
when a flight has to divert for weather or to avoid a 
traffic conflict, controllers typically issue vectors that 
take aircraft off of their flight plans.  In TBO 
however, the flight plan itself is changed.  In order to 
do this, information that maintains a complete 
connected trajectory needs to be exchanged between 
air and ground. The Future Air Navigation System 
(FANS) has been developed for this purpose but 
airlines have been slow to equip their aircraft with the 
moderately expensive FANS equipment since TBO is 
not presently used in the NAS; while the FAA has 
not implemented FANS procedures for the NAS (in 
part) because few aircraft are equipped to use them. 
The goal of the current research was to surface 
issues that may arise in a near-term implementation 
of TBO. In the long term, most aircraft may have a 
system such as FANS for air-ground trajectory 
exchanges, coupled with automation that can specify 
conflict-free [2] and weather-free paths [3].  
However, any near-term implementation of TBO 
must include procedures for communicating 
trajectories to aircraft that are not FANS equipped 
and procedures for pilots to request trajectory 
deviations, particularly for weather avoidance. We 
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developed such procedures for aircraft with three 
datacom communication equipage levels: Integrated 
datacom, Non-integrated datacom and Voice only. 
Integrated Datacom aircraft communicated using a 
simulation of the FANS-1/A interface currently 
available on some aircraft. These “FANS” aircraft 
were able to directly send downlinks and receive 
uplinks using the Flight Management System (FMS). 
Non-integrated datacom aircraft communicated using 
a simulated ACARS Control Display Unit (CDU). 
These “ACARS” aircraft had text-only datacom with 
no ability to automatically load uplinks directly to the 
FMS. Thus, flight plans delivered by ACARS had to 
be manually entered into the FMS via the CDU. The 
“Voice” only aircraft had no datacom. 
Currently, the ground infrastructure supporting 
FANS and ACARS is quite different. FANS is used 
for direct communication with Air Traffic Control 
(ATC), which uses it to uplink routes. It is almost 
exclusively used in oceanic operations. ACARS is 
used for communications between an aircraft and 
flight dispatch about strategic planning issues such as 
delays and weather re-routing. Despite the 
differences between them, it may be possible to 
capitalize upon the ACARS infrastructure to provide 
a limited “FANS-like” datacom with ATC for non-
FANS equipped flight decks. This may be quite 
valuable since, while we believe there will be little 
change to fleet equipage in the near term, we believe 
the FAA is in a position to act relatively quickly to 
update its own facilities, in particular to provide an 
integration of ACARS datacom with ATC tools. 
Based upon this, we developed TBO procedures that 
assumed such an integration with a NextGen ATC 
station. A goal of this ACARS-ATC integration was 
to make the procedures look and feel as similar to 
that of FANS as possible, simplifying the ATC task. 
Prior Research 
Efficient and accurate controller-pilot 
communication is critical to safe flight operations. 
Not surprisingly, errors do occur and are often 
associated with long ATC messages sent by the 
controllers with the intention to reduce their own 
workload [4]. FANS controller-pilot data link 
communication (CPDLC) amends traditional radio 
voice communication with a written message 
capability. Therefore, FANS is better equipped to 
handle clearances, advisories or warning messages 
and provide a potential medium to directly interface 
with the Flight Management System (FMS). In fact, 
analysis of recorded communications between en 
route controllers and pilots showed increased 
controller efficiency and reduced workload in mixed-
media environments incorporating both voice and 
datacom communications than in voice-only 
environments [5]. Such findings lend empirical 
support to the notion that CPDLC may be a superior 
method of communication. 
Other research, however, has found that voice 
communication remains essential and the 
combination of voice and datacom communications 
outperforms individual modes [6].  Specifically, 
Smith, Lee, Prevot et al. [7] found that voice and 
CPDLC each has its own set of unique advantages. 
They examined route negotiations between 
controllers and pilots using CPDLC or voice modes. 
They found that requests sent via CPDLC by pilots 
can provide clearer intent to the controllers than 
voice requests. On the other hand, they found that 
voice requests appear more salient to the controllers 
than do visual (text) requests, especially when they 
are busy. 
On the flight deck, mixed media environments 
(voice and datacom) have yielded mixed results: 
under time pressure mixing voice and datacom 
messages did not help capitalize on the advantages of 
either medium [8,9]. Closely spaced voice and 
datacom messages increased the number of requests 
for clarification for voice messages and the need to 
review the log for datacom messages. Others found 
that datacom communications also changed the 
nature of crew communication [10]. While the 
availability of datacom reduced the amount of ATC 
voice communications, within-crew communication 
regarding datacom messages increased, resulting in 
an overall increase in communication time. 
The utility of having advanced communication 
modes cannot be fully exploited without proper 
procedures that take into account their strengths and 
weaknesses. There has been very limited research on 
designing procedures for CPDLC especially in the 
context of TBO. Mueller [11] examined the 
possibility of mapping 4D strategic trajectory 
clearances that included metering, direct routing, and 
user-preferred routes to datacom messages that can 
be sent using FANS. Controllers used a trial planner 
to design strategic trajectory clearances that, upon 
approval, were sent as FANS messages to the 
aircraft. These clearances were then loaded and 
executed by the flight deck crew without 
intervention. Mueller found that the FANS-1/A, 
infrastructure and the prototype ground automation 
system appear to be able to satisfactorily implement 
trajectory-based clearances from controllers. 
In a follow-up study, Mueller and Lozito 
examined flight deck procedures for trajectory-based 
clearance negotiations [12]. They compared 
procedures for handling uplinked strategic trajectory 
clearances that varied the flight deck responsibility 
between the pilot flying and the pilot monitoring 
(sharing versus non-sharing) in one simulation study 
and whether to print datacom clearances in another. 
All procedures evaluated were rated to be generally 
suitable.  
Objectives 
The current research addresses two major 
challenges to near term implementation of TBO. 
First, previous research on designing procedures for 
strategic trajectory-based clearance negotiations has 
assumed FANS-1/A flight deck communication 
equipage [11,12]; however, the current fleet is simply 
not equipped for broad adoption of FANS 
procedures. Therefore, the current research explores 
possible implementations of TBO using voice 
procedures or, alternatively, making use of the 
ACARS datacom found on most transport category 
aircraft. Second, previous research on flight deck 
TBO procedures has focused on flight deck review 
and execution of clearances. While these issues are 
part of the current research, a primary focus in this 
study is on flight deck generated requests. 
Specifically, the current research looks at how 
aircraft could formulate requests using FANS, 
ACARS or voice in a TBO environment. 
To test our procedures for formulating requests, 
a human-in-the-loop simulation was conducted. In 
this simulation pilots and controllers engaged in route 
negotiation in en route environments with three types 
of flight deck communication equipage: FANS, 
ACARS, and voice only. The study uses weather as a 
way to drive communication. En route weather poses 
a special problem because alterations of flight plans 
must be done during flights. An additional 
complicating factor is that the air and ground have 
access to different information. In these cases, flight 
decks bear the responsibility for avoiding weather 
while ATC bears the responsibility for preventing 
conflicts. As a result, negotiation is necessary to 
achieve solutions that satisfy both air and ground. 
Further, when gaps in a storm front are sufficiently 
narrow, requests from the air to fly through them may 
be rejected due to congestion, and clearances from 
the ground to avoid these congested pathways may be 
rejected by the air because they are blocked by, or 
come too close to, weather. 
The current research sought to uncover potential 
problems for near-term implementation of TBO by 
‘stress testing’ the system. As such, we attempted to 
keep all planes on trajectories and to minimize radio 
use on datacom equipped aircraft. Therefore, except 
for safety of flight issues, we steered our air traffic 
controllers away from solutions that put aircraft on 
open trajectories (e.g., vectors or off-trajectory 
climbs and descents), and we told our pilots and 
controllers not to use radio for aircraft assigned to the 
FANS and ACARS conditions (again except for 
safety of flight). Relaxing these constraints may have 
improved system performance, and operator 
acceptance, but would not have served our goals. 
Concept of Operation 
In this simulation, the controller was responsible 
for managing approximately 12 aircraft in a high 
altitude sector in Kansas City Center’s airspace (ZKC 
90). The sector is on the center boundary adjacent to 
Indianapolis Center. The primary sector traffic in our 
simulation was the normal en route traffic flows in 
this sector along with UPS arrivals into UPS’s HUB 
at Louisville International Airport. Controllers, as in 
today’s operation, were responsible for aircraft 
separation and traffic management, while pilots were 
responsible for weather avoidance. Controllers were 
also responsible for maintaining trajectory-based 
operations if possible. To accomplish this task, they 
were instructed to minimize vectoring of aircraft by 
creating flight plan modifications using the trial 
planner [13] and delivering the modified trajectories 
via voice or datacom based on aircraft equipage type. 
In designing the datacom protocols, one of the goals 
of the study was to reduce the complexity and 
workload of managing three differently equipped 
aircraft types. Thus, from the controller perspective, 
sending and receiving information from a FANS and 
ACARS aircraft required the same actions on the 
controller Display System Replacement (DSR) 
station. However, the controllers were briefed on the 
flight deck procedures for loading and executing 
datacom clearances. 
There was an important difference between 
information available to controllers and pilots when 
handling weather deviation requests sent by either 
datacom or voice. The controllers constructed trial 
plans relative to traffic and weather on the DSR 
display, while pilot requests were based on flight 
deck weather radar. The NextRad weather (on the 
controller’s display) updated at 5-minute intervals. A 
bug in the simulation prevented updating of the 
(ground referenced) location of the weather on the 
flight deck (see Scenarios below). 
Initial procedures for the flight deck were 
developed by the authors, one of whom is a current 
airline pilot, and another who is a former air traffic 
controller. They were then vetted by two other retired 
controllers, and two pilots. The goal of all procedures 
was to keep an updated flight plan in a ground based 
“host” computer, and to make it possible for the 
aircraft to closely adhere to those flight plans. 
An assumption was that, in the near-term, the 
ground will have an advanced interface for displaying 
and modifying aircraft trajectories such as that 
proposed by Prevot [13]. It was also assumed that all 
flight decks have the ability to fly a track (rather than 
heading). In current day operations, it is typical for 
controllers to issue clearances for headings and 
monitor the aircraft to see that the heading achieves 
the desired track. In accordance with the general goal 
of NextGen to reduce controller workload, we felt 
that such monitoring could just as easily be 
performed by almost all modern commercial flight 
decks. 
Verbal communication of arbitrary waypoints 
(lat-longs) were judged to be potentially too error 
prone. Similarly, extended clearances containing 
multiple waypoints were judged to be a potential 
source of error. As a result, our procedures for 
managing such aircraft called for controllers to 
develop multiple waypoint clearances using a trial 
planner that calculated the initial track to the next 
waypoint.  Then the controller monitors the aircraft’s 
progress, issuing multiple track or simple “direct to” 
clearances, as needed to keep them on route.   
For planes that are FANS equipped, the crew 
can load clearances directly into the FMS. Thus, it is 
feasible to create arbitrary clearances and upload 
them to the aircraft.  
For planes that are ACARS equipped, the 
situation is more complicated. Flight plans can be 
sent to such aircraft as text messages. This reduces 
the opportunity for communication error. Thus, it was 
felt that flight plans with arbitrary waypoints such as 
those sent to FANS aircraft could be uploaded. 
However, the crew must then manually load such 
flight plans into the FMS, a potentially time-
consuming process. To assure that the plane 
remained on its flight path while the waypoint was 
being entered into the FMS, procedures were 
developed that allowed pilots to keep the aircraft on 
its trajectory using the autopilot until the clearance 
was entered (see ‘Flight Deck Procedures’ below). 
Method 
Participants 
Sixteen commercial airline pilots with glass 
cockpit experience (eight per week) and four retired 
TRACON controllers (two per week) were recruited 
for this simulation. Participant controllers were 
recruited based on their involvement in previous, 
similar simulations and were thus familiar with 
prototype ATC tools used in this simulation. Pilots 
were divided into two-person crews with the more 
experienced chosen as the captain.  They remained 
together for the duration of their participation. The 
simulation ran from August 16-27, 2010 with 
individual participants running in one of the two 
weeks. Due to unexpected events, a first officer from 
the second week dropped out part way through the 
simulation and was replaced with a captain from the 
first week. All pilots and controllers were 
compensated for their participation.  
Equipment 
Four dual-pilot stations and two controller 
stations were operated by study participants. In direct 
support of the simulation, researchers and 
confederates operated a simulation manager station 
and conducted training and observation of all 
participants. 
 
Figure 1. A Dual-Pilot Station 
Dual Pilot Stations
The dual-pilot station consisted of three 
monitors (see Fig. 1), on which the controls and 
displays necessary for operating a generic Boeing 
transport category aircraft were simulated. The paths 
of participant aircraft were manipulated using the 
Multi-Aircraft Control System (MACS) [14] 
autopilot Mode Control Panel (MCP) and dual 
Control Display Units (CDU's). Flight path and 
navigation information was presented on dual 
Cockpit Situation Displays (CSD's) and dual Primary 
Flight Displays (PFD's). Controls for hand flying the 
aircraft (e.g., yoke) were not available.  
The middle screen of the station was a shared 
touch screen monitor accessed by both pilots. It 
hosted the autopilot MCP, the two CDUs, and a text 
display consisting of a clock and message alerting. 
The left and right screens of the station each 
contained a CSD and a PFD for the pilot on that side. 
Displays on the two side screens were controlled by 
using a mouse, one for each pilot. 
The autopilot MCP, CDUs, PFDs and datacom 
message display were driven by MACS. The 
autopilot MCP and PFD's operated as on most 
Boeing transport category aircraft, while the CDU's 
operated like a Boeing/Honeywell unit and were used 
for datacom communications and inputting flight 
path modifications. The CSD was developed by 
NASA Ames Flight Deck Display Research 
Laboratory [15] and presented a 2D display of 
navigation information, weather radar targets and 
traffic out to 40 nm (similar to that displayed by the 
traffic collision avoidance system, TCAS). 
Controller Stations 
For controller stations, MACS was implemented 
in a controller mode, allowing air traffic controllers 
to track and manage aircraft in their assigned sector. 
Controller tools included datacom, conflict alerting 
and a trial planner for route modifications. 
Each participant also had a separate touch-
screen computer used to collect workload and flight 
plan acceptability ratings. For a discussion of this 
data see Brandt et al. [16].  
General Procedures 
Each week began with one day devoted to 
training, three days scheduled for data collection and 
a final day for make-up trials and debriefing. 
Participants were informed that weather and traffic 
issues would be present which would necessitate 
negotiation between the flight deck and ATC.  
Two simulation worlds were run simultaneously, 
each containing one participant controller and two 
participant dual-pilot flight decks. Also present were 
non-participant aircraft flown by confederate pseudo-
pilots to provide a realistic traffic load of 
approximately 12 aircraft at any time. Confederate 
“ghost controllers” managed traffic outside the 
experimental sector.
Scenarios 
In each world, the dual-pilot flight decks were 
arrival aircraft headed for Louisville International 
Airport (SDF), reaching top of descent near the 
eastern edge of the sector. Participants flew west to 
east through the sector and negotiated a storm front 
on the eastern side of the sector.  
There were four starting conditions at the 
beginning of the scenario as defined by the location 
of the weather and traffic. On the controller displays 
the weather for each of these four starting conditions 
evolved in various ways creating 16 total scenarios. 
Because the weather evolved differently in each case, 
controllers could not make assumptions about an 
optimal path through the weather until they watched 
it develop. A bug prevented movement of the weather 
on the flight deck. Thus the discrepancy between the 
location of weather seen on the flight deck and that 
seen on the ground was somewhat larger than 
intended. The entire simulation consisted of thirty-
two 20-minute scenarios. 
Experimental Design 
The experimental design consisted of two fixed 
factors (Aircraft Equipage, Airspace Mixture) and 
three random factors (Scenario, Crew, Controller). 
The Aircraft Equipage factor reflected the datacom 
communication capability levels of the individual 
participant aircraft. Three capabilities were modeled: 
FANS, ACARS and voice. Airspace Mixture was the 
number of variously equipped aircraft in the sector. 
There were three conditions: Predominantly Voice 
(80% voice, 20% FANS), Predominantly FANS 
(80% FANS, 20% voice) and Predominantly ACARS 
(60% ACARS, 20% voice and 20% FANS). These 
three conditions reflected three possible systems of 
managing the current majority of aircraft that are 
ACARS. The Predominantly Voice condition 
imagined that, as today, the ACARS system is not 
used by ATC and ACARS equipped aircraft are 
managed in the same manner as unequipped aircraft. 
The Predominantly FANS condition imagines that 
these aircraft are upgraded to have data 
communications integrated with the FMS. Finally, 
the Predominantly ACARS condition imagines that 
these aircraft are managed using special procedures. 
It was expected that the Airspace Mixture factor 
would affect the controller’s workload but have little 
effect on the crew. 
Note that the controller managed many pseudo-
piloted FANS and voice only equipped aircraft in 
every condition and many ACARS equipped aircraft 
in the Predominantly ACARS condition. The pseudo-
piloted aircraft were designed to react similarly to 
their participant counterparts. Also note that there 
were no ACARS aircraft in the Predominantly Voice, 
or Predominantly FANS, Airspace Mixture 
conditions.  
Each aircrew experienced each scenario twice, 
each time flying a different aircraft. Each aircraft 
crew performed four times in each of the six FANS 
and Voice equipage conditions (two times with each 
controller for that week) and eight times in the 
ACARS condition (four times with each controller 
for that week). Each scenario/experimental aircraft 
combination was used eight times (once per flight 
crew) once in each of the six FANS and Voice 
equipage conditions and twice in the ACARS 
equipage condition. 
Initial Maneuver Points 
Procedures were initially developed in which 
proposed flight plan amendments developed by the 
ATC contained an initial maneuver point (IMP) two 
minutes ahead of the aircraft. This was done in order 
to allow time to implement, negotiate, and possibly 
reject the proposal before any flight path maneuver 
began.   The IMP was automatically inserted by the 
ATC’s graphical trial planner.  On the other hand, 
requests developed on the flight deck would always 
be “off-the-nose” since the flight deck only had the 
FMS’s graphical trial planner, which does not 
generate IMPs. The intention was for the ATC to 
echo back acceptable Voice and ACARS flight deck 
requests with an IMP included.  For acceptable 
FANS flight deck requests, the ATC would simply 
accept them without inserting an IMP since that is 
how FANS is presently designed to work.  However, 
during training and initial runs, it became apparent 
that, for Voice aircraft, communicating this IMP, 
which was always a lat-long coordinate, increased 
controller workload disproportionally to any benefits 
in fidelity to the flight path.  As a result, the 
procedures were modified so that, for Voice aircraft, 
controllers deleted the automatically generated IMP.  
This resulted in ATC clearances that were off the 
nose and therefore required immediate flight deck 
implementation.  If there was a significant delay in 
this implementation (revealed by the ATC display 
showing the aircraft to be off path) controllers had to 
amend the flight plan in the host to correspond to the 
path actually being flown.    
Flight Deck Procedures 
Voice Only Aircraft 
Procedures on the flight deck for Voice aircraft 
were similar to those followed today, with the 
exception that trajectory-based requests and 
clearances were required. Thus, although pilots 
followed ATC clearances as today, these clearances 
often took the form of adding a waypoint (e.g., 
“UPS123, direct HILLS then PRINC remainder of 
the route unchanged”) rather than the unconnected 
vectors given today. Pilots were to enter this new 
route into their FMS. Similarly, when making a 
request, flight decks could request a deviation for 
weather, but were encouraged to select a named 
waypoint and request a deviation direct to that 
waypoint and then a point at which to return to the 
original route. In this way, the trajectory was 
preserved in the host during the deviation. 
FANS Equipped Aircraft 
When an uplinked clearance was received on a 
FANS equipped aircraft, a message appeared on the 
alerting display on the center monitor. The pilot-not-
flying was then to navigate to the ATC Messages 
page on the CDU and load the clearance into the 
FMS. If the clearance appeared acceptable (e.g., was 
clear of weather), the pilot would respond by sending 
an accept message via the CDU and execute the flight 
plan. Otherwise, the pilot would reject the clearance 
and follow up with a revised request to ATC via 
datacom or voice.  
For requests, pilots developed a modified flight 
plan in the CDU using standard tools. This route was 
then downlinked to ATC using the ATC message 
page on the CDU. Pilots then had to monitor the 
status of this message to see whether it was accepted 
or rejected. Accepted requests could be executed. 
Rejected requests were typically followed up with an 
amended clearance by ATC. 
ACARS Equipped Aircraft 
Clearances uplinked to ACARS aircraft were 
first translated into a free text format (by automation) 
that then appeared on the ACARS menu in the CDU 
(see example, Fig. 2). As with FANS messages, these 
were announced on the message alerting display. The 
pilot-not-flying would then navigate to the ACARS 
messages page on the CDU. The clearance was then 
read and confirmed with the flying pilot before 
entered into the FMS on the other CDU. 
AT: N3907W08710 PROCEED DIRECT 
N3945W08635 PRINC REST OF ROUTE 
UNCHANGED  
FMS CONTINGENCY: AT TIME 02:05:15Z 
FLY 055 TRACK. WHEN ABLE DIRECT 
N3945W08635 PRINC REST OF ROUTE 
UNCHANGED 
Figure 2. Example ACARS Clearance 
Clearances were presented in two parts. The first 
part was the clearance itself, which contained the 
path the aircraft was to fly listed as a series of 
waypoints (possibly including lat-longs). Second, 
there was an “FMS contingency” part. This 
contingency included a procedure to execute if the 
flight crew was not able to enter the clearance before 
arriving at the IMP, located ~2 minutes ahead of the 
aircraft. The FMS contingency provided the time at 
which automation had predicted the aircraft would 
reach the IMP and a track the pilots should fly to the 
second waypoint. In practice, the pilots usually 
entered the second waypoint into the CDU and 
waited for the assigned time to execute the maneuver.  
ACARS aircraft accepted clearances by free 
texting back WWW for Wilco and UNA for Unable, 
which were interpreted appropriately by the 
automation. Requests made by ACARS aircraft were 
completed through the free text function of the 
ACARS ATC message page. 
Controller Procedures 
Datacom requests were logged and ordered on 
the controller DSR in a special datacom-status list, 
based on the order in which they were received. 
However, the controller had discretion on when each 
request was handled. When a request arrived, it was 
also coded in the aircraft’s data tag. To handle the 
request, the controller would select an icon in the 
data tag.  If it was a FANS aircraft, the proposed 
route was shown, while for an ACARS aircraft, its 
request in the datacom-status list was highlighted. 
For voice aircraft, controllers handled the requests 
immediately, or else they were required to 
copy/remember the requests and ask the aircraft to 
standby. The procedure for modifying the host flight 
plan using the trial planner for all aircraft was 
generally the same. The controller modified the 
current path by first selecting the data tag route icon 
to display the route, creating a new waypoint on the 
original path, and finally dragging that waypoint so 
the resultant path was clear of weather and traffic. 
The path would automatically “snap” to a named fix 
if one was close to the desired location. The 
controller would uplink the new trajectory to datacom 
equipped aircraft or deliver the new clearance via 
voice. 
Voice Only Aircraft 
After receiving a request to deviate for weather, 
the controller would create an off-the-nose 
modification to the aircraft’s current flight plan using 
the trial planner. This modification would be clear of 
the displayed weather and traffic. The controller 
would then communicate the route via voice to the 
aircraft (e.g., “UPS123, fly track 360, direct FIPEN 
for weather deviation, then proceed direct PRINC.”) 
If the new route was clear of weather by a safe 
margin, pilots were to fly the assigned route. If the 
new route was unacceptable, the pilots would request 
a further deviation via voice.  Note that, because the 
request was off the nose (did not include an IMP), 
such approved requests generally resulted in the 
aircraft being off its trajectory requiring ATC to 
adjust the flight plan in the host. 
FANS Equipped Aircraft 
After receiving a request to deviate for weather, 
the controller would view the proposed path. If the 
path was conflict free and fit within the traffic 
management plan, the controller uplinked an 
approval message. Upon receiving approval, the 
flight crew would execute the requested change. 
Because the request was off-the-nose, this change 
would be off-the-nose. If the controller was unable to 
approve the requested flight path deviation due to 
safety and other concerns, UNA (for Unable) was 
uplinked followed by a modified flight path clear of 
weather and traffic based on the downlinked request. 
ACARS Equipped Aircraft 
Downlinked weather deviation requests from an 
ACARS aircraft were received as free text messages 
in the controller’s datacom list.  These were sent as 
off-the-nose requests to proceed either to a named 
fix, or for a specified direction and distance, with a 
return to fix on the original route.  The controller 
would acknowledge the request from the aircraft and 
then open the trial planner to create a route for the 
aircraft reflecting this request that would not be off-
the-nose, but instead included an IMP. If the 
proposed route was acceptable and fit within the 
traffic management plan, the controller uplinked an 
approval message. For unacceptable routes, the 
controller could uplink a reject message or a new 
route created with the trial planner. 
Dependent Variables 
A paper-and-pencil workload questionnaire was 
administered after each trial to collect workload and 
acceptability ratings for the entire trial. A post-
simulation questionnaire was administered after the 
final trial. The post-simulation questionnaire asked 
pilots to rate items on a 5-point Likert scale related to 
concept acceptability, safety, procedures, and 
simulation realism. Participants were provided space 
to add comments. In addition to the ratings variables 
collected from post-trial and post-sim questionnaires, 
objective data were collected in the form of 
performance, frequency of negotiations, and duration 
of negotiations. Performance was measured in three 
manners: the miles added to the original trajectory by 
the path modification (path stretch), the number of 
flight path amendments, and the percent of time the 
aircraft was not in conformance with the host 
trajectory (non-conformance - aircraft were tagged as 
non-conforming when 1 mile off path, or on a track 
15 deg discrepant from the nominal trajectory). 
Results 
Trajectory Conformance 
Our initial analyses show little difference 
between conditions in terms of the trajectories flown. 
ANOVAs conducted separately for Aircraft Equipage 
and Airspace Mixture found no significant 
differences in path stretch to avoid weather, time off 
path, or number of flight path amendments. The lack 
of effects on path stretch and amendments is not too 
surprising since the factors that drive flight path 
changes (e.g., weather, conflicting traffic, distance to 
top of descent) are built into the scenario and may 
overwhelm any influence of communication method.  
However, the absence of any effect of Aircraft 
Equipage on non-conformance is somewhat 
surprising, since it could be expected that the FANS 
condition should have performed best, and the Voice 
worst.   This was not found, but a surprising overall 
level of non-conformance was found.   
 
Figure 3. Cross Track Error 
Figure 3 shows cumulative distributions for the 
lateral distance from their trajectory (cross track 
error) for each combination of Aircraft Equipage and 
Airspace Mixture as well as the average across all 
aircraft. In this experiment, controllers were notified 
when aircraft were more than one nautical mile off 
their trajectory and told to address the problem. Yet 
aircraft were more than one nautical mile off their 
trajectories more than 25% of the time. 
Observations 
While we have not systematically categorized all 
instances of non-conformance, it is clear that much of 
the non-conformance seen in our data stems from 
trajectory modification requests made off-the-nose. 
One reason this caused problems was that we 
developed procedures that were superficially similar, 
resulting in some confusion for controllers. For 
example, with Voice aircraft controllers were told to 
verify that the request did not result in a conflict by 
creating an off-the-nose trial plan, entering it into the 
host, and then approving it verbally. For FANS 
requests they were told to load the downlinked 
trajectory and, if conflict free, approve it. For 
ACARS requests they were told to create a trial plan 
that had an IMP and uplink that trajectory. 
Controllers would often combine parts of different 
procedures, for example, creating an off-the-nose 
flight plan for an ACARS aircraft. (This would result 
in aircraft failing to turn as soon as requested while 
the pilots attempted to enter and vet the new flight 
path.) Such confusion could probably be reduced by 
making the procedures more parallel (e.g., never 
simply approving a request; instead always inserting 
a maneuver point two minutes ahead of the aircraft), 
or by adding training that specifically compared and 
contrasted the differences in these procedures.  
Another issue that arises when maneuvers are 
off-the-nose is that small differences between when 
the flight plan is loaded into the host on the ground 
and when it is loaded into the FMS on the aircraft 
will lead to non-conformance. For instance, if a 
FANS aircraft downlinks a trajectory request and the 
ground approves it (simultaneously loading it into the 
host), the host expects the aircraft to begin the 
maneuver immediately. If the aircraft is flying eight 
miles a minute and the pilots delay 8 seconds, they 
will be out of conformance. Again, this issue might 
be remedied if a controller uplinked a new flight plan 
with a specified IMP to FANS aircraft, or if pilots 
were made more aware of the importance of 
executing flight plan amendments immediately after 
they were approved. 
While the occurrence of non-conformance could 
be reduced with modified procedures and training, 
we are unlikely to be able to prevent aircraft from 
being out of conformance altogether. Recognizing 
this, we also gave controllers instructions to adjust 
the flight path on the DSR when aircraft were late in 
initiating a maneuver so that it matched the path the 
aircraft was actually flying. However, it appears that 
mental workload issues frequently prevented 
controllers from performing this operation. 
Air-Ground Negotiations 
Assumptions and Approach to the Analyses of 
Negotiations 
Every exchange between pilots and controllers 
that resulted in a change of flight plan in the aircraft’s 
FMS was operationally defined as a negotiation.  
Data from visual and verbal recordings, along with 
digitally recorded datacom was examined for each 
negotiation to determine the mode (Voice, FANS, or 
ACARS) used to initiate it, and if Voice was used in 
combination with datacom.   In addition, for each 
negotiation, the following information was gathered: 
the time to initial reply or acknowledgment, the 
initiator (ATC or flight deck), total duration (from 
first contact to final change of flight plan), and 
whether the initial proposal was accepted or a revised 
proposal was necessary. We were primarily interested 
in negotiations involving weather. Thus, because the 
modeled storm tops were too high to climb over, the 
analyses presented here only included negotiations 
that resulted in lateral flight plan changes.  
For most of the comparisons described below we 
conducted three tests, using controller, scenario, and 
crew as random factors. This was done to determine 
if the effects generalized across random variations in 
these three variables.  In most cases where tests were 
conducted, a significant or marginally significant 
effect of controller was accompanied by significant 
effects when using the crew or scenario as a random 
factor.  Therefore, only the F-tests using controller as 
the random variable are reported. 
Number of Negotiations Per Flight 
We categorized the negotiations along two 
dimensions: Aircraft Equipage (FANS, ACARS or 
Voice) and Initiator of the negotiation (Flight Deck, 
or ATC). This parsing showed that, of the 427 
negotiations, almost 75%  (304) were initiated from 
the flight deck. Also, almost all of the ATC-initiated 
negotiations came later in the scenarios as the ATCs 
were adjusting the flight paths to ensure timely 
arrivals to a downstream merge point.   
With respect to the Initiator factor one fact 
becomes immediately apparent; the number of such 
negotiations per flight varies by condition. While 
flight decks initiated requests at roughly equal rates 
regardless of equipage, controllers give far more 
clearances to FANS aircraft than ACARS or Voice 
aircraft (see Figure 4). Three 3x2 ANOVAs were 
conducted with Aircraft Equipage (FANS, ACARS 
or Voice) and the initiator of the negotiation (Flight 
Deck or ATC) as the fixed factors.  Significant 
effects of Aircraft Equipage (F2,6 = 19.33, p < .01 by 
controller) and Initiator (F1,3 = 69.34, p < .01 by 
controller) were found, while the interaction was 
marginally significant (F2,6 = 4.96, p = .054 by 
controller).  All effects were significant when using 
crew and scenario as random variables. The lower 
proportions of ATC initiated negotiations was 
expected (since flight decks have the responsibility to 
request weather avoidance rerouting) but the 
increased ATC initiated negotiations in the FANS 
condition was surprising.  A follow-up examination 
of the details of the FANS negotiations did not reveal 
any obvious explanation. 
 
Figure 4. Mean Negotiations Per Flight
Time to Initial Response 
The time taken to respond to a request or 
clearance is an important step in the negotiating 
process. Not only does it slow the negotiation down 
if responses are delayed, the controller or pilot 
making the request must think of contingencies until 
they know whether it will be accepted/approved. 
Figure 5 shows the time taken to respond as a 
function of the method used to initiate the negotiation 
as a “Tukey” boxplot [17]. For each condition, the 
solid line indicates the median; the box indicates the 
inter-quartile range (IQR); the whiskers indicate the 
range excluding “outliers”; and the circles indicate 
outliers, points more than 1.5 IQR from the box. 
There were significant effects of both Aircraft 
Equipage (F2,6 = 10.74, p < .05 by controller) and 
the Initiator (F1,3 = 10.41, p < .05 by controller) as 
well as their interaction (F2,6 = 8.17, p < .05 by 
controller).  All effects were significant when using 
scenario and crew as the random variables (since one 
crew never received an ATC initiated clearance by 
Voice or ACARS it was removed from the crew 
analysis here and below).
 
Figure 5. Initial Response Times 
Separate analyses showed that controllers took 
significantly longer to respond to flight deck initiated 
request sent by FANS than those using Voice (F1,3 = 
20.06, p < .05 by controller). A similar trend for 
ACARS requests was not quite significant by 
controller (F1,3 = 9.94, p = .051 by controller).  Both 
of these effects were significant by crew and 
scenario.  ACARS and FANS did not differ 
significantly, with the difference seen in Figure 5 due 
to a single controller who responded much slower to 
ACARS than to FANS.  However, the remaining 
controllers all showed small and opposite effects.   
While the pattern of flight deck responses to 
ATC initiated clearances is ordinally consistent with 
controllers responses to flight deck requests, the 
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effects are far smaller and less reliable.   Flight deck 
responses to ACARS clearances were slower than 
those to FANS,  (F1,3 = 4.70, p = 0.119, by 
controller) and slower than those to Voice (F1,3 < 
6.01, p = .092 by controller).  However, both of these 
effects were significant when using scenario and 
crew as random variables. Responses to FANS were 
also slower than responses to Voice (but not much), 
and this was also only marginally significant (F1,3 = 
6.50, p = .084, by controller).  This effect was 
significant when analyzed by crew, but not when 
analyzed by scenario. 
That the datacom modes are slower than voice is 
not surprising for either the flight deck or the ATC.  
However, the size of the effects for ATC responses is 
very large, ranging from 1 to 2 minutes - while the 
activities required to visualize and vet flight deck 
proposals is probably the greatest for Voice uplinks.  
Comparatively, flight deck responses to ACARS 
uplinks were delayed generally less than 1 minute, 
and this is almost certainly due to 1) the need to key 
in the request to determine its acceptability and 2) the 
keystrokes necessary for the flight deck to respond.  
The few seconds of delay in flight deck responses to 
FANS (versus Voice) was probably due to the need 
to physically interact with the CDU. 
Choice of Communication Method 
Figure 6 shows the overall proportion of time 
voice was used (at any time) during negotiations in 
conditions where datacom was available; and the 
proportion of time voice was used to initiate 
negotiations. For example, Figure 6 shows that 40% 
of all ATC Initiated negotiations with ACARS 
equipped aircraft utilized voice at some time during 
the negotiation, while half of these (about 20% of the 
total) began with a voice clearance from ATC.   
In addition to the fact that voice was regularly 
resorted to in the datacom conditions, two main 
effects can be seen; voice was 1) more likely to be 
used in negotiations initiated by the flight deck than 
by negotiations initiated by ATC, and 2) more likely 
to be used for ACARS than for FANS initiated 
negotiations.  On the other hand, the ATC appears 
more likely than the flight deck to initiate a 
negotiation by voice (as compared to just using voice 
during the negotiation). Due to the small number of 
voice initiated negotiations (24) and ATC initiated 
ACARS negotiations using voice at all (17), it was 
not possible to get reliable estimates of the 
proportions for the individual crews, controllers, or 
scenarios.  Thus the only significance tests we ran 
were those comparing overall voice use for FANS 
and ACARS for the Flight Deck Initiated trials.  Here 
the main effect due to Aircraft Equipage was found to 
be significant (F1,3 = 11.74, p < .05).  The effect of 
Aircraft Equipage was significant when using crew 
and scenario as random variables.   
 
Figure 6. Voice Usage  
 
Figure 7. Proposals Rejected 
Rejected Proposals 
Both the flight deck and ATC could reject 
proposed amendments. The proportion of proposals 
rejected is shown in Figure 7. Similar to the problems 
encountered with the analysis of voice usage, the 
numbers of flight deck rejections of ATC initiated 
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negotiations are too small, especially for ACARS (14 
instances) for reliable estimates of controller, crew or 
scenario proportions.  Therefore only the rejections 
of the flight deck initiated proposals were analyzed. 
Here the main effect due to Aircraft Equipage was 
found to be significant (F2,6 = 8.13, p < .05). 
The relatively high proportion of ATC rejections 
of flight deck voice proposals stands out.  There are 
several possible explanations for this, including the 
imprecision of flight deck generated voice proposals 
and the ease with which the controller is able to 
suggest alternatives.   
 
Figure 8. Duration of Negotiations 
Duration of Negotiations 
The Figure 8 shows distributions of the duration 
between the initial contact and the final execution of 
the newly negotiated flight plan. Clear differences 
can be seen and were confirmed in two 3 (Aircraft 
Equipage) x 2 (Initiator) ANOVAs using controller 
and scenario as random factors.  The third random 
factor, crew, was not used due to the relatively low 
numbers of ATC initiated negotiations with ACARS 
and Voice aircraft; this resulted in two crews not 
contributing data to all conditions. Significant effects 
for Aircraft Equipage (F2,6 = 16.26, p < .01 by 
controller), Initiator (F1,3 = 32.75, p < .05 by 
controller), as well as their interaction (F2,6 = 9.26, p 
< .05 by controller), were found.  All effects were 
significant when using scenario as a random variable.   
The pattern in the time taken from initial request 
to execution results from many factors: the method 
chosen for the interaction (e.g., whether a datacom 
equipped aircraft chose to contact ATC by voice or 
datacom), the time taken to respond to the initial 
request, whether the initially requested trajectory was 
accepted or further modified and the time taken to 
implement and execute the new trajectory. One trivial 
factor is that our procedures for ACARS called for 
pilots to wait until they reached the initial maneuver 
point before executing the flight plan change.  The 
pattern however can be seen to be quite similar to 
that for response to initial request (Figure 5).   
Observations 
Perhaps the most interesting result of the 
negotiations analysis was the prevalent use of voice 
in the datacom conditions, particularly with ACARS.  
Some conjectures can be made about the reason for 
this.  First, other analyses showed that the ATC 
typically took a very long time to respond to flight 
deck generated datacom requests.  Pilots complained 
about this (see Observations in next section).  
Therefore, it is likely that the pilots contacted ATC 
by voice when, in their opinion, the response was not 
forthcoming.  This is especially likely given that 
response to voice was so immediate.  Also, it is 
possible that voice was used for more complex or 
difficult requests, or when there was need for more 
immediate changes to avoid the weather.  Finally, in 
the datacom conditions, the ATC had a greater 
propensity than pilots to initiate clearances using 
voice.  This suggests that ATC may also have used 
voice more often in their responses to flight deck 
generated datacom requests.  
Another significant, but puzzling, finding was 
that ATC initiated requests more often in the FANS 
condition than in the ACARS or Voice conditions.  
The reasons for this are not immediately obvious, and 
need further study. 
Subjective Ratings 
Workload Ratings 
At the end of each trial, all participants rated 
their workload (1 low to 5 high) on four criteria. 
Pilots were asked to rate Overall and Peak Workload 
associated with their flight and with weather 
avoidance, while controllers were asked to rate 
Overall and Peak Workload associated with 
maintaining separation and with handling weather 
avoidance requests.  
Four post-trial controller workload ratings were 
obtained for each level of Airspace Mixture. These 
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12 resulting mean workload ratings clustered in a 
fairly restricted range (from 3.28 to 3.85). For these 
measures, controllers' mean workload was highest in 
the Predominantly FANS condition, and was lowest 
for Predominantly Voice, with the exception of 
Overall workload associated with separation, for 
which Voice and ACARS were nearly identical. 
These trends were significant for the “Overall 
workload associated with separation” (F2,6 =13.905, 
p=.006) and “Overall workload associated with 
weather avoidance requests” (F2,6=5.966, p=.037). 
As expected, there was no effect of Airspace 
Mixture on any pilot workload measure. These varied 
from 2.10 to 2.77. There were significant effects of 
Aircraft Equipage; across all workload measures 
pilots consistently rated their workload highest in the 
ACARS condition and lowest in the Voice condition. 
These differences were significant for Overall 
workload associated with flight, (F2,14  = 10.310, 
p=.002); Peak workload associated with flight, (F2,14 
= 4.811, p=.026); and Overall workload associated 
with avoiding weather, (F2,14)=5.484, p=.017). 
Rating of Procedures 
After the simulation, both pilots and controllers 
rated how much they agreed with 15 statements (1 - 
low to 5 high) about each of the different 
communication procedures. For example, pilots were 
asked to rate their agreement with “I am comfortable 
with the ACARS/FANS/Voice based trajectory 
management concept,” and “Trajectory operations 
using ACARS/FANS/Voice are safe.” Controllers 
were asked to rate their level of agreement with “I 
felt adequately aware of what the pilots of 
ACARS/FANS/Voice aircraft were doing,” and 
“Trajectory operations using solely ACARS/ 
FANS/Voice is, in principle, a workable concept.” 
Controller Ratings: Controllers generally rated 
the two datacom procedures identically. Two of the 
four rated ACARS and FANS identical ratings on all 
15 statements. That is, they saw no difference in the 
two procedures on these measures. One controller 
gave FANS better ratings on three criteria, and the 
remaining controller gave ACARS a better rating on 
one criterion. In addition, only one of the four 
controllers agreed with the statement “I was very 
aware of whether an aircraft I was handling was 
integrated datacom communicaiton (FANS-1A) or 
ACARS.” Thus, despite the differences found in the 
ACARS and FANS negotiation analyses, it appears 
that our procedures were successful in allowing 
ACARS-equipped aircraft to be managed similarly to 
FANS aircraft from the controller’s perspective.  
While ACARS and FANS appeared very similar 
to the controllers, Voice, naturally, was quite 
different. Yet the four controllers differed on whether 
Voice was preferable to the two datacom conditions 
(FANS and ACARS). One controller rated the 
datacom conditions better than Voice on eight of the 
15 criteria, while rating Voice better on none. A 
second controller rated the datacom better on six and 
Voice better on one. However, a third controller rated 
Voice better on eight and datacom better on none, 
and the final controller rated Voice better on one and 
datacom better on one. Thus, controllers varied in 
their relative preferences for Voice and datacom.  
Pilots Ratings: Unlike the controllers, pilots 
clearly distinguished between ACARS and FANS. 
For the twelve statements that allowed us to infer a 
preference ranking among the three Aircraft 
Equipage conditions, Voice was always rated best 
and ACARS always rated worst, with FANS falling 
in the middle (all statistically significant at the p < 
.05 level). This is not surprising since, on the flight 
deck, pilots were less familiar with ACARS and 
FANS. In addition ACARS required significantly 
more work. In ACARS, flight requests had to be 
manually typed into the ACARS CDU page, while 
text copies of uplinked flight plans had to be accessed 
on the CDU ACARS page, and then manually input 
again into the CDU FMS legs page.   
Observations 
It is clear that pilots, as a whole, did not like 
datacom, especially ACARS. Some insight into this 
finding can be gleaned from comments gathered 
during the simulation, responses to open ended 
questions on the post-simulation questionnaire, and 
from comments made during the post-simulation 
debriefing.  Pilots had three major concerns about the 
datacom procedures.  The first, and perhaps expected, 
concern is the time and effort to create and manage 
messages on the CDU (mentioned by 7/16 for both 
FANS and ACARS). A second concern was ATC 
response time (mentioned by 7/16 pilots for FANS 
and 13/16 for ACARS). In current day operations 
with voice, the controller responds to messages as 
they are received. However, in a datacom 
environment they seem to ascribe priorities in their 
responses to messages based on traffic management 
needs. For example, if the controller receives a 
request from an aircraft that will soon be handed off, 
the controller may respond to it before responding to 
a previous request by an aircraft in the middle of the 
sector. Meanwhile, other flight decks wait without 
feedback that the controller has even received their 
message. Finally, there were concerns related to 
message format, such as how the ACARS clearance 
was formatted, and how the ACARS and FANS 
messages came up across two pages, thereby 
requiring additional effort to integrate.  
Discussion 
While other studies have shown clear benefits to 
datacom procedures, our results show a more mixed 
picture. Controllers showed no clear preference for 
datacom, and pilots showed quite the opposite, a 
strong preference for Voice. Similarly, Voice 
procedures were not worse than datacom procedures 
in our preliminary examination of performance 
measures. Why the difference? In our study, most 
flight path amendments came as a result of pilot 
requests, while previous work has looked almost 
entirely at clearances initiated by the controller. 
Datacom equipage found on current day transport 
category aircraft makes it difficult to formulate 
requests and lacks the immediate feedback of 
traditional voice protocols. The generally slow 
response time for datacom has been noted in other 
studies [6,7]. Groce and Boucek [18] specifically 
note that pilots found datacom unacceptable for 
weather avoidance clearances because of the time 
critical nature of such clearances.  
It is possible that a communication protocol that 
combines both datacom and voice could result in 
more acceptable response times while accruing many 
of the benefits of datacom (such as reduced 
transmission error, the ability to transmit more 
complex clearances, and a reduction in voice traffic).  
Indeed, pilots and controllers mixed them despite our 
stated desire that they not do this.   For example, a 
process whereby pilots could initiate requests by 
voice and receive an acknowledgement by voice, 
which would then be followed up by datacom 
exchange, might work better. Several pilots in our 
study stated that their concerns about datacom would 
be greatly ameliorated if requests were acknowledged 
more promptly even if there was a delay in the actual 
clearance. Such measures might not only increase the 
acceptability of FANS but also make non-integrated 
datacom, such as ACARS, acceptable to pilots. This 
combined approach could also significantly increase 
options for near-term implementations of TBO. 
ACARS is just one example of non-integrated 
datacom, albeit one that is currently available on the 
majority of transport category aircraft. One could 
imagine equipping the flight deck with an electronic 
flight bag (EFB) capable of sending and receiving 
flight plans. Because of the lower certification 
standards, EFBs can be a cheaper and more flexible 
way of upgrading aircraft avionics. The use of EFBs 
for communicating flight plans might also facilitate 
deployment of systems with better interfaces for 
creating requests such as that described in [15].  
This study also highlights the difficulties with 
keeping aircraft on trajectories in an environment 
where aircraft can make requests. Because no class of 
aircraft can easily create flight plans that contain 
IMPs, controllers cannot simply approve requests but 
must either create a new flight plan and send it back 
or adjust the flight plan in the host to match what the 
aircraft is actually flying. Either way adds 
significantly to the controller workload. One way the 
controller can ameliorate this problem for himself is 
to allow planes to go off trajectory. Despite our 
emphasis in training that aircraft always be on host 
trajectories, we occasionally observed that a 
controller appeared unconcerned if one or two flights 
were not conforming. This may have been because 
they were allowed to hand off non-conforming 
aircraft to the next sector, and/or because there were 
no metering constraints in our study.  However, it 
may also reflect controllers reverting to their standard 
operational procedures where they consider a 
trajectory okay so long as they can visually confirm 
that it contains no conflicts. 
While the current study uncovered substantial 
difficulties with TBO procedures, it should be noted 
that our scenarios were designed to surface such 
difficulties should they exist. Pilots might prefer 
Voice, and controllers might not uniformly prefer 
datacom on a stormy day when there are many pilot 
requests.  However, benefits for datacom seen in 
other studies under conditions where it is primarily 
controllers issuing clearances for separation and 
interval management are, in all likelihood, real. The 
current study should not be taken as a reason to 
question the value of TBO, only as additional caveats 
on how it should be implemented. 
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